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Abstract
Introducing physical outcomes in coalitional games we note that they and social choice problems are equivalent (implying
that so are the theory of implementation and the Nash program). This clariﬁes some misunderstandings (in regard to
invariance and randomness), sometimes found in the Nash program. Ó 1998 Elsevier Science S.A.
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1. Introduction
The standard deﬁnition of a coalitional game does not include physical outcomes, but only feasible
utility proﬁles. This abstract framework may sometimes lead to basic misunderstandings. The purpose
of this note is to dispel two such misconceptions, found in the Nash program. Generalizing the model
in Serrano (1997), we extend the deﬁnition of a coalitional game to include physical outcomes. This
will prove helpful to our purpose.
If players are Von Neumann–Morgenstern expected utility maximizers, the different properties of
invariance of a utility scale to transformations must play a central role. We present two results. Both
are simple corollaries of invariance and they are well understood (especially the ﬁrst one) by the
practitioners of the abstract theory of implementation. Unfortunately, the same cannot be said for the
Nash program, both in its folklore and in its printed material. One could attribute this to the ‘‘black
box’’ of the characteristic function, entangled with the view that ‘‘the Nash program is not
implementation.’’
The ﬁrst result asserts that a coalitional solution concept can be arrived at from the noncooperative
theory only if it is scale invariant. By the same token, if a solution is not scale invariant its normative
appeal is also very restricted, since an uninformed planner cannot implement it. Essentially, if there is
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a noncooperative game related to such a solution, the game must change with the underlying
environment (see Bossert and Tan, 1995 for a game related to the egalitarian bargaining solution).
We shall consider a solution concept to coalitional games as being independent of any randomiza-
tion if it can be implemented by a strategic game and a strategic equilibrium concept that do not
include any random element. Our second result says that if a solution concept is independent of
randomizations, it must be ordinally invariant (like the core, bargaining sets or Walrasian equilibria).
This implies that major solution concepts in coalitional games (e.g. the Nash bargaining solution, the
NTU–Shapley value) can be derived strategically only by considering the possibility of random
outcomes: either chance moves, mixed strategies, or pure strategy equilibrium reﬁnements based on
trembles must be part of the analysis. Mechanisms that support these solution concepts cannot be
criticized for introducing random devices, since they are essential to the implementation results. We
can dispel now numerous comments (received in seminars over the years) present in the folklore, like
‘‘the fair coin again?,’’ ‘‘an implementation of the Shapley value would be much nicer without
randomness, which already gives it away,’’ or ‘‘Can’t you think of more realistic and natural
mechanisms? When have you seen people randomizing in the real world?’’ Thus, our second result
stresses the major role that risk plays in much of the theory of coalitional games.
2. The model
Usually, coalitional games are represented by characteristic functions:
Deﬁnition. A characteristic function game (N, V) consists of
1. a set of players N 5h1, 2,...,nj;
2. a characteristic function V that assigns to every nonempty set of players S ,N a set V(S) of real
valued utility proﬁles (that the members of S may reach).
In the above standard deﬁnition physical outcomes are not speciﬁed. We consider the following
(more general) notion:
Deﬁnition. A coalitional game G 5(N, X, hu j ) consists of: ii [ N
1. a set of players N 5h1, 2,...,nj;
2. a pure outcome function X that assigns to every nonempty set of players S ,N a set of S-outcomes
X(S) that the members of S may reach. The function X satisﬁes: if X(S)±[, then there exists a
partition hT ,...,T j of N\S with X(T )±[ for all i 51,...,k; and there exists a coalition Q with 1 ki
X ( Q ) ± [ .
3. for each player i [N, a payoff function u that assigns a real number u (x) to every outcome ii
x [<X ( S ), where the union is taken over all coalitions S that contain i.
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coalition S in the partition. We denote by X (G) the set of all outcomes of a coalitional game G, and N
* by X (G) the set of all probability distributions on X (G). Since we want to distinguish between NN
random and nonrandom outcomes in the sequel, we introduce these distinctions here.
Note that our assumptions on the outcome function X imply that the set X (G) summarizes all the N
information in X, and that X (G)±[. Also, the deﬁnition restricts attention to c-games (Shubik, N
1984, pp. 130–131).
Deﬁnition. Let V be a class of coalitional games. A pure solution c on V is a correspondence that
assigns to each coalitional game G [V a set c(G),X (G). N
Deﬁnition. A solution c on V is a correspondence that assigns to each coalitional game G [V a set
* c(G),X (G). N
Solution concepts which are deﬁned for characteristic function games can be adapted into our
framework by assigning to each outcome of the characteristic function game a nonempty set of
outcomes of the coalitional game.
Another important class of problems found in the literature is gathered under the name of social
choice problems.
Deﬁnition. A social choice problem P 5(N, A, hu j ) consists of: ii [ N
1. a set of players N 5h1, 2,...,nj;
2. a nonempty set of alternatives A;
3. for each player i [N, a payoff function u that assigns a real number u (a) to every alternative ii
a [ A .
There is a natural equivalence between social choice problems and coalitional games. For every
social choice problem (N, A, hu j ) assign the coalitional game (N, X, hu j ) deﬁned by X(N)5 A, ii [ Ni i [ N
X ( S ) 5[if S ±N. Conversely, we can associate a social choice problem to each coalitional game by
deﬁning A5X (G). N
An immediate consequence of the equivalence established in the previous paragraph is that the
abstract theory of implementation and the Nash program for coalitional games should be viewed as
the same research agenda. See Serrano (1997) on this point.
3. Results on invariance
By emphasizing the physical structure of coalitional games, one may be able to reach certain
general conclusions that were difﬁcult to draw from the characteristic function. Our results on
invariance below are simple examples of this.
Deﬁnition. Let G 5(N, X, hu j ) be a coalitional game. A coalitional game G95( N,X,hwj )i sa ii [ N ii [ N
positive afﬁne transformation of G if for all i [N there exist real numbers a .0 and b such that for ii
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Deﬁnition. A solution c on V is scale invariant if for every two games G, G9[V, such that G9 is a
positive afﬁne transformation of G, then c(G)5c(G9).
Deﬁnition. Let G 5(N, X, hu j ) be a coalitional game. A coalitional game G95( N,X,hwj )i s ii [ N ii [ N
an order preserving transformation of G if for all i [N and for all outcomes x and x9 in which i is
involved in, w (x).w (x9) if and only if u (x).u (x9). ii i i
Deﬁnition. A pure solution c to a class of coalitional games V is ordinally invariant if for every two
games G, G9[V, such that G9 is an order preserving transformation of G, then c(G)5c(G9).
Next we present analogous deﬁnitions for strategic games, as our conclusions are relevant for the
Nash program. Our results below hold also for games in extensive form, and only for the sake of
brevity, we omit the deﬁnitions.
Deﬁnition. A strategic game G 5[N,( S), ( u ) ] consists of: ii [ Ni i [ N
1. A set of players N 5h1, 2,...,nj; and for all i [N
2. A set of pure strategies S ; i
3. A payoff function u that assigns a real number u (s) to every proﬁle s [P S . ii i [ Ni
Deﬁnition. The mixed extension of a strategic game G 5[N,( S), ( u ) ] is a strategic game ii [ Ni i [ N
** * G 5 [ N ,( S ), ( u ) ], such that for all i [N: ii [ Ni i [ N
* 1. S is the set of probability distributions over S (mixed strategies of G); and ii
** * 2. u assigns to every proﬁle of mixed strategies s [P S the expected utility that corresponds to i i[Ni
the probability distribution over pure strategies and to the payoffs u . i
We can distinguish between two types of equilibrium concepts in strategic games. One takes into
account only considerations of the strategic game, and the other considers also the mixed extension.
Clearly, pure strategy Nash equilibrium belongs to the former type, and mixed strategy Nash
equilibrium belongs to the latter. However, there are some selections from pure strategy Nash
equilibrium (e.g., trembling hand perfect) that take into account considerations of the mixed
extension. The distinction between the two types of equilibrium concepts cannot be made by using
their deﬁnitions, as these may be adapted to incorporate the mixed extension. In order to make the
distinction formal we introduce the concepts of invariance in strategic games as well.
In all strategic equilibrium concepts, agents are assumed to choose their actions with accordance to
their preferences over the relevant set of outcomes. This implies that the theory should be insensitive
to alternative utility representations of the same ordinal preferences. In the case where the mixed
extension of the game is considered, the preference order is deﬁned over the mixed outcomes, thus
under the expected utility hypothesis it is required that positive afﬁne transformations of the utility
function over the pure outcomes would not change the set of equilibria.When the equilibrium concept
does not take into account the mixed extension, any order preserving transformation of the utility
function over pure outcomes should not change the set of equilibria. First we deﬁne the notions of
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Deﬁnition. An equilibrium concept f over a class of strategic games S is a correspondence that
* assigns to every strategic game G 5[N,( S), ( u )] [ S a set f(G),P S . ii [ Ni i [ Ni [ Ni
Deﬁnition. A pure strategy equilibrium concept f over a class of strategic games S is an equilibrium
concept for which f(G),P S for all G [S. i[Ni
Now, we deﬁne invariance notions.
Deﬁnition. Let G 5[N,( S), ( u ) ] be a strategic game. The game G95[N,( S), ( w ) ] is a ii [ Ni i [ Ni i [ Ni i [ N
positive afﬁne transformation of G if for all i [N there exist real numbers a .0 and b such that for ii
all pure strategy proﬁles sw( s ) 5 au( s ) 1 b. ii ii
Deﬁnition. An equilibrium concept f over a class of strategic games S is scale invariant if for every
two games G, G9[S such that G9 is a positive afﬁne transformation of G, it is satisﬁed that
f(G)5f(G9).
Deﬁnition. Let G 5[N,( S), ( u ) ] be a strategic game. The game G95[N,( S), ( w )] i s ii [ Ni i [ Ni i [ Ni i [ N
an order preserving transformation of G if for all i [N and for all pure strategy proﬁles s and s9,
w (s).w (s9) if and only if u (s).u (s9). ii i i
Deﬁnition. A pure-strategy equilibrium concept f over a class of strategic games S is ordinally
invariant if for every two games G, G9[S such that G9 is an order preserving transformation of G,i t
is satisﬁed that f(G)5f(G9).
The class of ordinally invariant equilibrium concepts includes pure strategy Nash equilibrium, pure
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium (and its stationary reﬁnements), pure undominated strategies,
iterative elimination of dominated actions, among others.
Now we turn to connect the deﬁnitions of invariance in coalitional and strategic games, which will
have simple implications for the Nash program.
Deﬁnition. Let V be a set of coalitional games all of which share the same pair (N, X). A mechanism
with respect to a pair (N, X) consists of two components:
1. a pair [N,( S) ] with the same set of players and a pure strategy set for each of them, ii [ N
* 2. a function m:P S ®X (G). i[Ni N
Deﬁnition. Let V be a set of coalitional games all of which share the same pair (N, X). A mechanism
m [N,( S), m ] implements c on V by f if for all G [V f([N,( S), ( u )] ) 5 c ( G ), where ii [ N ii [ Ni i [ N
m * u ( s ) 5 u ( m ( s )). ii
Result 1. If a mechanism implements a coalitional solution c on V by a scale invariant equilibrium
concept, then c is scale invariant.
Given the above deﬁnitions, the easy proof is left to the reader.
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prescribes a weakly Pareto efﬁcient outcome that gives the same utility to each of the players, can
never be arrived at from the strategic approach to bargaining. This casts doubt on Thomson’s
(Thomson, 1994, p. 1242) assertion that this solution is (together with Nash’s and Kalai and
Smorodinsky’s) one of the three most important solutions to bargaining problems.
Bossert and Tan (1995) provide an arbitration game whose Nash equilibria yield the egalitarian
bargaining solution. Their arbitration game form changes with the utility functions when one
considers the class of all bargaining problems. Alternatively, Result 1 implies that the domain of
utility proﬁles allowed in their game (if we ﬁx the strategy sets) is such that the egalitarian solution is
scale invariant on this domain. Actually, our second result shows that their domain is even more
restrictive.
Result 2. If a mechanism implements a coalitional solution c on V by an ordinally invariant
equilibrium concept, and the range of m is a subset of X (G), then c is a pure ordinally invariant N
solution.
Again the easy proof is left to the reader. j
In light of this result, and in contrast to some opinions in the folklore, it is not surprising that the
implementations of the Shapley value (Gul, 1989; Winter, 1994; Hart and Mas-Colell, 1996), of the
Nash bargaining solution (Nash, 1953; Binmore et al., 1986, extended to multilateral bargaining
problems by Chae and Yang, 1994 and Krishna and Serrano, 1996), of the kernel (Serrano,
forthcoming), of the Kalai–Smorodinsky solution (Moulin, 1984), among others, all include chance
moves in one way or another. The solution concepts that are implemented by these mechanisms when
applied to NTU games are scale invariant, but not ordinally invariant. Also, for some classes of
coalitional games, it is easy to adapt the mechanisms above based on the characteristic function to our
framework with physical outcomes.
Returning to Bossert and Tan (1995) arbitration game, considered as the division of a dollar. Notice
that the hypotheses of Result 2 are met (as the authors use pure strategy Nash equilibria, and all the
possible outcomes of their game do not require randomization), thereby implying the following: the
class of bargaining problems for which the strategy sets of the game are ﬁxed must be such that the
egalitarian solution is ordinally invariant. That is, their domain is so restrictive that the egalitarian
solution yields the same division of the dollar for all problems. We therefore disagree with Thomson
(1994), p. 1276), who considers this work as an implementation result.
The reader may be puzzled by Result 2 and the ‘‘support’’ of the Nash solution by Binmore et al.
(1986) when it is based on the bargainers’ time preferences (Rubinstein, 1982). Although pure
strategy subgame perfect equilibrium is ordinally invariant, it should be noted that an ordinal change
of the preferences over the division of the dollar in a given period constitutes a real change in the
bargainers’ time preferences. Thus, we use the word ‘‘support’’ in quotation marks, as the set of pure
outcomes of the pair [N,( S) ] is not a subset of the set of pure outcomes of the coalitional game, ii [ N
but an extended set that includes time contingent outcomes that do not appear in the coalitional game.
In contrast, in the interpretation of the discount factor as the probability of breakdown, the two sets of
feasible pure outcomes (that of the coalitional game and that of the mechanism) coincide, but then of
course the chance moves appear explicitly in the strategic situation. We ﬁnd, like Osborne and
Rubinstein (1990), section 4.4, that the interpretation of the Nash bargaining solution with risky
outcomes is more natural than the one based on time preferences.N. Dagan, R. Serrano / Economics Letters 58 (1998) 43–49 49
Thus, risk appears in the theory of coalitional games as one of its fundamental components, in the
sense that many central solutions (such as the NTU Shapley values, pure bargaining solutions) rely
heavily on it. This fact had been stated for bargaining theory in the work of Nash (1950), but it had
not been emphasized as much in general coalitional games. We conclude that randomness in game
theory is not just a trick to convexify best responses in order to prove existence of equilibrium.
Randomness is a necessary condition to implement many solutions to coalitional games. It is
interesting to note that randomness is viewed in the abstract theory of implementation as a way to
enhance the set of correspondences that can be implemented (see, for example, Abreu and
Matsushima, 1992).
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